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IF YOU NEED ME, CALL ME: THE IMPORTANCE AND MEANS OF 
MATCHING OPPORTUNITY ZONE INVESTMENT WITH 
COMMUNITY WANTS AND NEEDS 
Arda Setrakian* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The bill that eventually became the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
(TCJA) was introduced in the House of Representatives on November 2, 
2017.1  In less than two months, on December 22, 2017, the bill became 
Public Law No. 115-97.2  This Comment concerns Opportunity Zones, a 
concept created by the TCJA3 and now formally encoded in Subtitle A, 
Chapter 1, Subchapter Z of the Internal Revenue Code.4  The Opportunity 
Zone program, as set out in Subchapter Z, provides three avenues 
through which individuals who reinvest their capital gains in designated 
low-income (and some non-low-income) communities, called “qualified 
opportunity zones,” throughout the United States may defer and reduce 
their capital gains tax liability.5  Such incentives serve to spur efforts by 
the private sector to revitalize and develop economically distressed 
communities, thus creating jobs and giving hope to the individuals 
within them.6  This Comment, in applying economic theory to stories of 
failed similar efforts in the past, urges state and local governments to 
augment the current incentives through additional incentives that 
would attract investors to specific types of businesses, thus increasing 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., McGill University. 
 1 H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 2 An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent 
resolution on the budget for the fiscal year 2018.  Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. 
 3 The concept was derived from legislation called the Investing in Opportunity Act, 
which was introduced by Senator Tim Scott and former Representative Pat Tiberi.  The 
Promise of Opportunity Zones, JOINT ECON. COMM. (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2018/11/the-promise-of-
opportunity-zones. 
 4 See 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z–1 (2019); 131 Stat. 2054, 2183. 
 5 See id. § 1400Z–2(b)–(c). 
 6 See, e.g., 165 CONG. REC. H116 (daily ed. July 11, 2019) (statement of Rep. 
Thompson); Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Sept. 3, 2019). 
SETRAKIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  5:17 PM 
1280 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1279 
the likelihood that communities will successfully realize the program’s 
goals. 
Part II of this Comment will describe the Opportunity Zone 
program and the three categories of tax incentives that it offers.  It will 
briefly explain the criteria necessary for the incentives to operate, such 
as which communities qualify for the program and how communities 
were selected.  It will then present some of the ways in which 
communities and investors have responded.   
Part III will explore historical instances in which private 
investment has been utilized or justified as a means for economic 
development.  In applying the economic theory of asymmetric 
information to such instances, it will demonstrate the attractiveness of 
having investors provide funds not for projects that they have chosen 
based on their own discretion but, rather, for specific types of projects 
that the communities themselves want or need.   
Part IV will explain that, even if investors should tailor their 
investments to communities’ wants and needs, the task is not so simple; 
there are many other risks that investors must consider when choosing 
where and in which projects to invest, such as the risk underlying the 
types of businesses a community seeks.  It will show that, indeed, 
investors had initially flocked to seemingly lower-risk investments, such 
as to real estate projects and, geographically, to locations where 
redevelopment plans were initiated even before the Opportunity Zone 
program was created.   
Thus, Part V will argue that governments, preferably those that are 
state or local, would be wise to augment the current program through 
additional incentives—such as those that increase the tax incentive 
based on business type, whether through allowing deferment or multi-
year tax holidays or through a lower tax rate—so as to attract investors 
to projects that will benefit individuals within the opportunity zones.  It 
will consider the issue from a policy standpoint, asking, for example, 
how far we are willing to go to incentivize investors and examining 
issues of equity, administrability, and efficiency. 
Part VI will conclude that, in so augmenting the current program 
such that its benefits will accrue to the communities themselves, state 
and local governments should closely assess not just their communities’ 
needs and wants but also the types and levels of risk that their 
communities impose. 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROGRAM 
The Opportunity Zone program provides for special, favorable tax 
treatment of capital gains that are reinvested into qualified opportunity 
funds.7  While the legislation contains many intricacies, the core of it is 
relatively straightforward.  Specifically, a taxpayer who acquires a gain 
from the sale or exchange of property held by the taxpayer, where the 
other party to the sale or exchange is unrelated to the taxpayer, and 
within 180 days of the sale or exchange, reinvests that gain in a qualified 
opportunity fund may choose not to include the amount of that gain in 
their calculation of gross income for the taxable year.8  Instead, the 
taxpayer may choose to defer recognition of the gain to the year in which 
the property acquired within the 180 days is sold or exchanged or to 
2026, whichever is earlier.9 
The benefit to such taxpayers is not only vis-à-vis deferment, as the 
legislation also provides for special treatment in the calculation of 
basis.10  If a taxpayer reinvests their capital gains in a qualified 
opportunity fund and holds the latter investment for at least five years, 
the taxpayer shall increase the basis11 of the investment, initially set to 
zero, by an amount equaling ten percent of the amount of gain 
deferred.12  The ultimate effect of the provisions is that the taxpayer gets 
to both defer payment of taxes on the taxpayer’s initial capital gains as 
well as decrease the amount of capital gain on which the taxpayer owes 
taxes (with respect to the initial investment) by ten percent.13  If the 
taxpayer holds the opportunity fund investment for at least seven years, 
the taxpayer shall further increase the basis of the opportunity fund 
investment by an amount equaling five percent of the amount of gain 
deferred.14  Lastly, if the taxpayer holds the opportunity fund 
investment for at least ten years, the taxpayer’s basis upon sale or 
 
 7 See generally § 1400Z–2. 
 8 § 1400Z–2(a)(1). 
 9 § 1400Z–2(b)(1). 
 10 See § 1400Z–2(b). 
 11 Section 1012 of the Internal Revenue Code defines the basis of a property as the 
cost of the property unless otherwise provided.  Id. § 1012(a).  When a taxpayer sells or 
otherwise disposes of property, the taxpayer generally must recognize the entire 
amount of the resulting gain or loss as part of their gross income for the taxable year.  
Such gain or loss is calculated by subtracting the basis of the property, generally 
meaning the cost of the property when the taxpayer acquired it, from the amount 
realized, meaning the sum of any money received for the property plus the amount of 
fair market value of the property in excess of any money received upon sale or 
disposition.  Id. § 1001(a)–(c). 
 12 Id. § 1400Z–2(b)(2). 
 13 See id. 
 14 § 1400Z–2(b)(2)(B)(iv). 
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exchange of the opportunity fund investment shall equal the fair market 
value of the investment on the date of sale or exchange.15  Assuming that 
the taxpayer sells or exchanges the property for fair market value, the 
effect of this provision is that the taxpayer need not recognize any gain 
on the sale or disposition of the taxpayer’s opportunity fund investment.  
While taxpayers who take advantage of the five- or seven-year tax 
incentive may defer payment to as late as 2026, according to a proposed 
regulation, those who seek to benefit from the ten-year incentive may 
do so through December 31, 2047, so long as they dispose of their 
interest in the opportunity fund investment by the end of 2047.16 
Section 1400Z-1 of the Internal Revenue Code defines qualified 
opportunity zone as “a population census tract that is a low-income 
community that is designated as a qualified opportunity zone.”17  A 
qualified opportunity fund, then, as referred to above, is a corporation 
or partnership that has the purpose of investing in qualified opportunity 
zone property.18  Specifically, the fund must hold at least ninety percent 
of its assets in such property.19  Qualified opportunity zones were 
 
 15 § 1400Z–2(c). 
 16 Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. 54279, 54283 (proposed 
Oct. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).  For example, assume that, in 2017, a 
taxpayer buys an investment property for $100,000.  In 2019, the taxpayer sells the 
property for $200,000.  Normally, the taxpayer would have to pay capital gains tax in 
2019 on the resulting $100,000 gain.  If instead the taxpayer reinvests the $100,000 by 
placing it in a qualified opportunity fund, the taxpayer need not pay capital gains tax on 
the $100,000 in 2019; rather, he may defer such payment until the earlier of when he 
sells his opportunity fund investment or 2026.  Moreover, if the taxpayer holds the 
opportunity fund investment until 2024, and thus for at least five years, with respect to 
the original (non-opportunity fund) investment, the taxpayer will have to pay capital 
gains tax on only $90,000 (rather than the full $100,000) and will have to do so in 2024 
(as opposed to doing so in 2019).  If the taxpayer holds the opportunity fund investment 
until 2026, and thus for at least seven years, the taxpayer will have to pay capital gains 
tax on only $85,000 and will have to do so in 2026.  Finally, if the taxpayer holds the 
opportunity fund investment for at least ten years, say until 2029, the taxpayer will pay 
capital gains tax on $85,000 in 2026 with respect to the original investment but will not 
pay any capital gains tax on his gain realized from the opportunity fund investment 
because his basis in the opportunity fund investment will be considered equal to the fair 
market value of the opportunity fund investment. 
 17 Id. § 1400Z–1(a). 
 18 Id. § 1400Z–2(d)(1). 
 19 Id. § 1400Z–2(d)(1). Opportunity zone property is divided into three categories: 
qualified opportunity zone stock, qualified opportunity zone business property, and 
qualified opportunity zone partnership interest.  Id. § 1400Z–2(d)(2).  Qualified 
opportunity zone stock consists of stock in a corporation that qualifies as an opportunity 
zone business, which generally refers to a trade or business in which almost all of the 
tangible property owned or leased is qualified opportunity zone business property at 
the time of the stock issuance.  Id. §§ 1400Z–2(d)(3), (d)(2)(B).  Qualified opportunity 
zone business property consists of “tangible property used in a trade or business of the 
qualified opportunity fund if” the property was purchased by the qualified opportunity 
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designated in each state by the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury after being 
nominated by the states’ respective governors, or “chief executive 
officer[s].”20  Governors had to make their nominations within ninety 
days of the TCJA’s enactment,21 and each was allowed to nominate a 
number of population census tracts within their state not exceeding 
twenty-five percent of the number of low-income communities22 within 
their state.23  Governors were not limited to choosing from low-income 
tracts; rather, a population census tract that was not a low-income 
community could still qualify as an opportunity zone, so long as the tract 
bordered a low-income community designated as a qualified 
opportunity zone and the median family income did not exceed 125 
percent of that of the bordering, low-income community.24  Such tracts 
could constitute a maximum of five percent of the total designated 
tracts.25  Designations remain in effect for ten years from the date of 
designation.26 
Although not bound by legislative history, governors seeking 
guidance in choosing opportunity zones could look to House Committee 
Report 115-466, which would require them, in nominating tracts, to 
consider those that “(1) are currently the focus of . . . private economic 
development initiatives . . . (2) have demonstrated success in 
geographically targeted development programs . . . and (3) have 
recently experienced significant layoffs.”27  Governors could also turn to 
an IRS-developed, online Nomination Tool, which was specially created 
to help governors in the process.28  Furthermore, some states created 
portals through which cities and counties could apply to be included in 
 
fund after December 31, 2017; the original use of the property begins with the qualified 
opportunity fund, or the fund substantially improves the property; and during 
substantially all of the holding period for the property, substantially all of the property’s 
use was in a qualified opportunity zone.  Id. § 1400Z–2(d)(2)(D).  Lastly, qualified 
opportunity zone partnership interest essentially refers to an interest in the capital or 
profits of a domestic partnership that qualifies as a qualified opportunity zone business.  
Id. § 1400Z–2(d)(2)(C). 
 20 § 1400Z–1(b)(2)(C). 
 21 § 1400Z–1(b)(1)(A); § 1400Z–1(c)(2)(B). 
 22 Low-income communities are defined based on poverty rates and median family 
income, as per 26 U.S.C. § 45D(e).  See The Promise of Opportunity Zones, JOINT ECON. 
COMM. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/
2018/11/the-promise-of-opportunity-zones. 
 23 § 1400Z–1(d). 
 24 § 1400Z–1(e)(1). 
 25 § 1400Z–1(e)(2). 
 26 § 1400Z–1(f). 
 27 H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 538–39 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). 
 28 See Rev. Proc. 18-16, 2018-09 I.R.B. 383. 
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their state’s governor’s nominations.29  For example, in Mississippi, the 
Governor’s office launched such a portal on the Mississippi 
Development Authority’s website.30  In New Jersey, tracts were chosen 
based on a formula using the Municipal Revitalization Index (MRI), 
which reflected economic indicators such as income, unemployment 
rate, and property values as well as geographic distribution, access to 
transit, and the value of existing investments such as those already 
encouraged by state incentives.31  In addition, town mayors and the New 
Jersey Congressional delegation were able to provide input and 
feedback throughout the selection process.32 
As of this writing, there are 8,764 opportunity zones throughout 
the United States and its territories.33  There are as few as fourteen 
opportunity zones in the Virgin Islands and as many as 879 in 
California.34  There are 514 opportunity zones in New York and 169 in 
New Jersey.35  The median number of opportunity zones per state is 
approximately 109, with Mississippi falling just below the median 
at 100 and Oklahoma rising just above the median at 117.36 
Once the designation process was complete, the baton passed to 
investors and the communities in which they could invest.  In a 2018 
interview, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin stated his belief that the 
Opportunity Zone program would ring in $100 billion of private capital 
investment.37  While the original legislation does not require 
information reporting such that the Department of the Treasury can 
track the program’s progress and effectiveness,38 and thus whether such 
belief has been validated, websites such as OpportunityDb, founded by 
internet entrepreneur Jimmy Atkinson, provide some information, 
 
 29 Butler Snow LLP, Nomination Portal for Opportunity Zone Designations Now Open, 
JDSUPRA (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/nomination-portal-for-
opportunity-zone-65437. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Opportunity Zones, DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, STATE OF N.J., https://www.state.nj.us/
dca/divisions/lps/opp_zones.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 32 Id. 
 33 See, e.g., Melissa Heelan Stanzione, Opportunity Zones Give Big Law ‘Pop-Up’ Teams 
Plenty of Work, BNA (May 28, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/
opportunity-zones-give-big-law-pop-up-teams-plenty-of-work. 
 34 Opportunity Zones by Location, OPPORTUNITYDB, https://opportunitydb.com/
location (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Interview by Bob Cusack with Steven Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury (Sept. 
27, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/408980-mnuchin-predicts-100b-in-cap-
investment-from-new-opportunity-zones. 
 38 See generally Request for Information on Data Collection and Tracking for 
Qualified Opportunity Zones, 84 Fed. Reg. 18648 (May 1, 2019). 
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including total opportunity zone investment capacity; the number of 
existing funds so far; and details regarding listed funds’ location, size, 
management, and asset class.39  As of August 27, 2019, nearly a year and 
a half after the first set of opportunity zones were designated,40 only 109 
funds were listed on OpportunityDb.41  Such funds pushed total 
investment capacity (i.e., not necessarily actual investment) to $37.4 
billion.42  The accuracy of this data is questionable; the NCSHA, for 
example, listed a total of 184 funds as of July 17, 2019.43 
Despite this shortfall, an April 2019 article noted that the program 
had thus far caused a “frenzy” among private client groups across 
several industries, including banking, law, accounting, and real estate.44  
According to the article, a February 2019 IRS hearing about opportunity 
zones “had lines out the door.”45  Nevertheless, for what seemed to be a 
significant surge of interest in the program, funds had been slow in 
attracting capital.46  Such “frenzy” and interest may have just been what 
one commentator called “irrational exuberance.”47  In explaining this 
lack of movement, some investors pointed to the need for further 
guidance from the Treasury;48 others pointed to the risk and lack of 
momentum of funds.49  Other factors that slowed down investment were 
the uncertainty over which funds to invest in; the need to commit to a 
ten-year lock-up to reap the program’s full, tax-free benefit; and the fear 
 
 39 Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, OPPORTUNITYDB, https://opportunitydb.com/
funds (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); see also NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HOUS. AGENCIES, NCSHA 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE FUND DIRECTORY (2019), https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/
uploads/NCSHA-Opportuntity-Zones-Fund-Directory-7.17.19.pdf. 
 40 Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Jan. 2, 2020) 
(“The first set of opportunity zones, covering parts of 18 states, were designated on April 
9, 2018.”). 
 41 Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, OPPORTUNITYDB, https://opportunitydb.com/
funds (last visited Dec. 28, 2019). 
 42 Id.  As of December 28, 2019, the website listed 128 funds and total investment 
capacity of $41.3 billion.  Id. 
 43 NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HOUS. AGENCIES, NCSHA OPPORTUNITY ZONE FUND DIRECTORY 
(2019), https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uploads/NCSHA-Opportuntity-Zones-
Fund-Directory-7.17.19.pdf. 
 44 Lynnley Browning, Opportunity Zones Knocking, but Few Answering the Call So Far, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-
10/opportunity-zones-knocking-but-few-answering-the-call-so-far. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Shortly after the article was written, on April 17, 2019, the Treasury released a 
second set of proposed regulations, providing further guidance for investors.  See I.R.S. 
News Release IR-2019-75 (Apr. 17, 2019). 
 49 Browning, supra note 44. 
SETRAKIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  5:17 PM 
1286 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1279 
that a fund becomes disqualified, thus depriving investors of the 
program’s incentives.50  One commentator pointed out that, indeed, not 
much capital had been raised so far.51  Another noted that most of the 
available investment opportunities were simply not strategically 
appropriate for her firm’s clients.52  Another, further, pointed to the lack 
of IRS guidance as the cause of the program’s slow start, noting that 
interest in the program, which offers unparalleled and highly generous 
tax incentives, “exploded” after the Treasury released its second set of 
guidance.53  Still, numerous sources pointed to the excitement and buzz 
of the investment community surrounding the Opportunity Zone 
program, despite the program’s slow beginnings.54 
Many states and communities seem to mirror investors’ 
excitement, as reflected in their early attempts to lure in investors.55  
Erie, Pennsylvania, like various other states and locales, has 
implemented free WiFi throughout its opportunity zones.56  Erie has 
also launched what is, in essence, a marketing campaign to attract 
investors.57  Calling Erie “Pennsylvania’s Flagship Opportunity Zone,”58 
the city has created a website explaining why investors should choose 
Erie;59 providing a set of guiding principles (in the form of a 
questionnaire) for investors, so as to promote diversity and sustainable 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Kathleen Pender, Tax Questions Answered, Opportunity Zone Fund Rush Begins, S.F. 
CHRON. (June 14, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Tax-
questions-answered-Opportunity-Zone-fund-13992079.php. 
 54 See, e.g., Chris Dier-Scalise, The Most Exciting Piece of Opportunity Zone Investing 
Is Still Being Defined, BENZINGA (July 31, 2019), https://www.benzinga.com/general/
crowdsourcing/19/07/14169709/the-most-exciting-piece-of-opportunity-zone-
investing-is-still-being-defined; Jessica Guerin, Opportunity Zones Have Investors 
Excited. So Why Aren’t More Buying In?, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/48785-opportunity-zones-have-investors-
excited-so-why-arent-more-buying-in; Michael Van Someren, Capitalizing on 
Opportunity Zones, NAT’L L. REV. (June 8, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
capitalizing-opportunity-zones. 
 55 See Oscar Perry Abello, What’s the Latest on Opportunity Zones?, NEXT CITY (Aug. 
20, 2019), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/whats-the-latest-on-opportunity-zones. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Why Invest in Erie, Pennsylvania?—Flagship Opportunity Zone, FLAGSHIP 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE DEV. CO., https://www.flagshipopportunityzone.com/why-invest-in-
erie-pennsylvania-duplicate (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 58 See Promoting Erie’s Opportunity Zones—Flagship Opportunity Zone, FLAGSHIP 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE DEV. CO., https://www.flagshipopportunityzone.com/about (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2020) (“The City of Erie . . . designated as Pennsylvania’s Flagship 
Opportunity Zone.”). 
 59 See Why Invest in Erie, Pennsylvania?, supra note 57. 
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growth;60 and even displaying a project portfolio that colorfully 
presents projects in need of investment, such as startups, a motel, and 
an educational center.61  The city also partnered with KPMG in hosting a 
two-day event, called “Erie Homecoming 2019,” across all eight of its 
opportunity zones.62  The event featured “provoking presentations on 
Erie’s unprecedented market momentum” and on-site visits to potential 
projects.63 
Similarly, Birmingham, Alabama has launched an initiative that 
brings together civic leaders, business leaders, and residents with the 
goal of facilitating the identification of projects and areas where 
improvement and funding are needed.64  New Jersey, too, has created an 
online hub on the State’s official website, featuring, for example, an 
interactive map that allows viewers to see the locations of opportunity 
zones; opportunity zone projects; and a plethora of other items, such as 
major power plants, Brownfield Development Areas, job density, 
commercial sales data, public transportation, and medical facilities.65  
The website also lists resources for investors and developers, such as 
IRS guidance and information regarding existing state incentives;66 for 
 
 60 See Guiding Principles—Flagship Opportunity Zone, FLAGSHIP OPPORTUNITY ZONE DEV. 
CO., https://www.flagshipopportunityzone.com/guiding-principles (last visited Jan. 2, 
2020). 
 61 See Project Portfolio—Flagship Opportunity Zone, FLAGSHIP OPPORTUNITY ZONE DEV. 
CO., https://www.flagshipopportunityzone.com/projects (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 62 See Erie Homecoming 2019, ERIE REG’L CHAMBER AND GROWTH P’SHIP, 
https://homecoming.eriepa.com (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Press Release, City of Birmingham, Ala., Mayor Randall Woodfin Announces 
Innovative Public-Private Initiative to Help Develop Birmingham’s 24 Opportunity 
Zones (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.birminghamal.gov/2019/04/12/mayor-randall-
woodfin-announces-innovative-public-private-initiative-to-help-develop-
birminghams-24-opportunity-zones. 
 65 NJ Community Asset Map, N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 
https://njdca.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=96ec274c50a348
90b23263f101e4ad9b (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 66 Such as low-income housing tax credits; the New Jersey Redevelopment 
Investment Fund, which provides flexible financing for business and real estate 
ventures; the Neighborhood Revitalization Tax Credit Program (NRTC), which provides 
businesses with a tax credit for funds provided to nonprofit entities involved in 
revitalization efforts; and the Urban Enterprise Zone program, which provides 
businesses with incentives such as the ability to charge less sales tax and a tax credit for 
hiring full-time employees.  See About UEZ, N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 
https://www.nj.gov/dca/affiliates/uez/about/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits, N.J. HOUS. AND MORTG. FIN. AGENCY, https://njhousing.gov/dca/
hmfa/developers/credits (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); Neighborhood Revitalization Tax 
Credit Program (NRTC), N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, https://www.state.nj.us/dca/
divisions/dhcr/offices/nrtc.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2020); New Jersey Redevelopment 
Investment Fund (RIF), N.J. REDEVELOPMENT AUTH., https://www.njra.us/new-jersey-
redevelopment-investment-fund-rif (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
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opportunity zone residents;67 and for local governments, such as 
strategies for success and a state grant program for municipality or 
county governments who sufficiently demonstrate a strategic 
opportunity zone plan for catalyzing and implementing investment.68  
While not as luring as Erie’s website, the page nonetheless features 
many resources for individuals involved in or affected by the program.  
California offers a similar website.69 
On the other hand, Boulder, Colorado does not seem to share in the 
zeal and excitement; specifically, the city told investors to wait while the 
city updated its land use and zoning regulations in opportunity zones.70  
As of December 28, 2019, the city listed only a few resources on its 
website, such as links to IRS regulations and a mere five links to existing 
development plans that may guide investors in choosing where to 
invest.71  Similarly, the State of Georgia, which has 260 opportunity 
zones,72 seems to barely make a buzz about the fact.  The zones, sixty 
percent of which are found in rural areas, represent significant 
concentrations of poverty.73  Nevertheless, it is difficult to find, through 
a Google search, much marketing material promulgated by many of the 
zones.  The City of LaGrange, for example, merely provides on its 
webpage a short description of the Opportunity Zone program, a few 
links (such as to a rezoning application),74 and a basic map indicating 
qualifying tracts.75  As of September 2019, the Georgia Department of 
Community Affairs similarly only provided a bare minimum of 
 
 67 Resources for Opportunity Zone Residents and Stakeholders, STATE OF N.J., 
https://nj.gov/governor/njopportunityzones/residents/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 
2020). 
 68 Opportunity Zone Challenge Program, N.J. ECON. DEV. AUTH., https://www.nj
eda.com/financing_incentives/large_business/Opportunity-Zone-Challenge-Program 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2020); Resources for Local Governments, STATE OF N.J., https://nj.gov/
governor/njopportunityzones/local/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 69 See California Opportunity Zones, STATE OF CAL., https://opzones.ca.gov (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2020). 
 70 Abello, supra note 55. 
 71 See Opportunity Zone Program, CITY OF BOULDER, https://bouldercolorado.gov/
business/opportunity-zone-program (last visited Dec. 28, 2019). 
 72 Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, Federal Opportunity Zones Announced 
for Georgia (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.dca.ga.gov/sites/default/files/federal_
opportunity_zones_named_by_treasury_0.pdf. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See Opportunity Zones, CITY OF LAGRANGE, GA., http://www.lagrange-ga.org/
CommunityDevelopment/Opportunity_Zones (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 75 See Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, Official Opportunity Zone Map for—City of LaGrange, 
http://www.lagrange-ga.org/Content/Templates/documents/community-
development/lagrange-oz-map.pdf. 
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information, including a map of qualifying zones and FAQs.76  Thus, not 
every city has been initially eager, like most, to jump on board the 
opportunity zone train. 
III.  LISTENING TO OUR COMMUNITIES: APPLYING THE THEORY OF ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION TO STORIES OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE NAME OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
While it seems that many investors and communities alike are 
excited about the Opportunity Zone program,77 concerns remain about 
who, in the end, will benefit from such a program.  In a New York Times 
op-ed, renowned economist Paul Krugman criticized the program as 
part of a rushed bill full of destructive loopholes; as a way out for 
Republicans who would rather bribe private investors to invest in 
infrastructure rather than do so themselves; and as targeting wealthy 
individuals (with sixty-one percent of the provision’s benefits flowing to 
the top one percent of households).78  Another New York Times article 
called the program “a windfall for the rich,” stating that the tax break, 
meant to help low-income communities, was instead causing billions of 
investment profits to be funneled into projects such as high-end 
apartment buildings and hotels, student housing, and storage facilities.79   
Indeed, the concept that the program seems to promote—that of 
private investment in the name of economic development—is not a new 
one.  And the stories discussed below, which highlight how the concept 
has played out in past instances, reveal that concerns regarding who will 
benefit, and whose interests are truly being served, are not baseless.  
The stories suggest that, for the Opportunity Zone program to succeed 
in its mission of helping distressed communities, there must be an 
affirmative effort for investments to reflect the needs and wants of the 
residents within those communities.  Furthermore, a view of these 
stories in light of the economic theory of asymmetric information 
suggests that the benefit of such efforts may accrue not only to 
communities but, mutually, to investors and the national economy as 
well. 
 
 76 See generally Federal Opportunity Zones, GA. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 
https://www.dca.ga.gov/community-economic-development/incentive-programs/
federal-opportunity-zones (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
 77 See supra Part II. 
 78 Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Great Tax Break Heist, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/opinion/trump-tax-opportunity-zones.html. 
 79 Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities 
Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html. 
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A.  Instances of Private Investment in the Name of Economic 
Development: Kelo, Poletown, and Amazon HQ2 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”80  In 1997, Susette Kelo purchased and restored a 
quaint, pink, waterfront house in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood of 
New London, Connecticut.81  To Ms. Kelo’s dismay, around the same 
time, city officials were in the works to revitalize the neighborhood, 
seeking to ameliorate the economic distress that plagued the city 
following the closure of a naval facility.82  Accordingly, with the backing 
of then-Governor John Rowland’s administration, New London 
Development Corporation (NLDC)—a private nonprofit organization 
created for city development planning—produced a development plan 
for Fort Trumbull.83   
But the NLDC did not act with an unguided hand; rather, the 
housing, office space, and infrastructure that would be built to revitalize 
Fort Trumbull would, ultimately, support Pfizer, Inc., a major 
pharmaceutical firm, in its plan to build a new headquarters nearby.84  
To implement this plan—a plan driven by private investment in the 
name of economic development—the NLDC sought to acquire land from 
numerous property owners in the Fort Trumbull area.85  With city 
officials’ support, Pfizer would move in; in turn, draw in other 
businesses; and thus set the stage for New London’s revitalization.86  
Despite the NLDC’s authority to exercise New London’s eminent domain 
power, and despite NLDC’s harassment of homeowners, many 
homeowners—including Ms. Kelo—refused to sell their properties, to 
give up their homes, so as to make way for the new developments.87 
 
 80 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 81 Kelo Eminent Domain—Institute for Justice, IJ.ORG, https://ij.org/case/kelo (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 82 Ilya Somin, The Story Behind Kelo v. City of New London—How an Obscure Takings 
Case Got to the Supreme Court and Shocked the Nation, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/05/29/the-story-behind-the-kelo-case-how-an-obscure-takings-case-came-to-
shock-the-conscience-of-the-nation. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Jones Day, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Kelo v. City of New London: A 
Landmark Development Regarding the Governmental Power of Eminent Domain, JONES 
DAY (July 2005), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2005/07/the-supreme-
courts-decision-in-ikelo-v-city-of-new-londoni—a-landmark-development-regarding-
the-governmental-power-of-eminent-domain. 
 87 Somin, supra note 82. 
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The dispute that arose between such homeowners and the city 
eventually made its way to the Supreme Court in a case known as Kelo 
v. City of New London.88  In ruling for the city, the Court held that a city’s 
exercise of its eminent domain power under the Fifth Amendment, or 
the power of a government to take property for public use,89 is 
constitutional when done in pursuit of an economic development plan.  
Particularly, economic development satisfies the “public use” prong of 
the Fifth Amendment.90  This is true even if the plan will benefit private 
parties, as it often will,91 and even if the property being taken is itself not 
blighted, as in Kelo.92  Notably, the Court refused to adopt a rule, as 
suggested by the petitioners, requiring a “reasonable certainty” that the 
economic benefits would actually accrue; such an inquiry lay beyond the 
role of federal courts.93  Ms. Kelo and eight other petitioners would be 
forced to give up their homes.94 
Just four years after Kelo, in 2009, the New York Times published an 
article titled, “Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case,” resurfacing 
harsh memories and critique from community members.95  Four years 
later, barrens of empty acres lay where dozens of taken homes once 
stood.96  No hotels, no condominiums, and no stores, for which the land 
was taken, were built.97  Pfizer, and 1,400 jobs, would move out of New 
London to a cheaper location just a few miles away.98  After almost 
twenty years since the start of the battle, Ms. Kelo noted, “[N]othing has 
been built.”99  “[W]e still have a building,” said city councilman Robert 
M. Pero, but “I don’t know who’s going to be looking for a building like 
 
 88 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 89 National Eminent Domain Power, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.
cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-5/national-eminent-domain-power (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
 90 Id.  The Court reasoned that “[p]romoting economic development is a traditional 
and long-accepted function of government,” and “[t]here is . . . no principled way of 
distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that [the Court 
has] recognized.”  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. 
 91 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485. 
 92 See id. 
 93 Id. at 487–88. 
 94 Id. at 470.  One of the petitioners, Wilhelmina Dery, had lived in her Fort Trumbull 
house, in which she was born in 1918, her entire life.  Id. at 475. 
 95 Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/nyregion/13pfizer.html. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Susette Kelo, Opinion, I Still Feel the Pain of Losing My ‘Little Pink House’: Susette 
Kelo, USA TODAY (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/04/
16/private-land-seizure-pfizer-new-london-little-pink-house-column/507608002. 
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that in this economy.”100  The city had once again “destroy[ed] 
neighborhoods and homes, without regard to the families who live in 
them.”101 
In Kelo, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion, quoting the 
dissent in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.102  
Particularly, Justice O’Connor quoted Justice Fitzgerald’s assertion that, 
if local officials are authorized to decide that a particular commercial or 
industrial use of a property is more beneficial to the public than another, 
present use, then no property, regardless of its value to the current 
owner, is immune from being condemned for the benefit of private 
interests who will execute such higher use.103 
Poletown,104 since overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock,105 
also arose out of a situation in which a local government attempted to 
justify private investment as a means for economic development.106  
Specifically, the Detroit Economic Development Corporation had 
attempted to exercise its condemnation power to take a large tract of 
land from the plaintiffs in order to give that land to General Motors 
Corporation (GM) for a new assembly plant—a plant that would 
promote industry, commerce, and jobs and thus tax revenue.107  In 
affirming the trial court’s decision for the city, the Michigan Supreme 
Court found that the city’s exercise of its eminent domain power to 
transfer property from one private user to another did not constitute the 
taking of such property for private use in violation of Michigan’s 
eminent domain power under its constitution.108  The court did not 
adopt the plaintiffs’ argument that GM would, in the end, be the primary 
beneficiary, and thus that the taking was not for public use [or 
purpose].109  Rather, the court reasoned that it is the state legislature’s 
role, not the court’s, to decide whether the taking serves a public 
 
 100 McGeehan, supra note 95. 
 101 Kelo, supra note 99. 
 102 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504–05 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 103 Id. (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 
(1981) (Fitzgerald, J., concurring)). 
 104 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455. 
 105 Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (2004). 
 106 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 455. 
 107 Id. at 457. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 458–60. 
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purpose.110  Furthermore, the legislature had delegated such decisions 
to municipalities in allowing them to exercise condemnation powers.111   
The court also referred to the substantial amount of evidence that 
the city had presented in the case below to demonstrate the dire 
economic conditions facing city and state residents, the need for 
revitalization, and, in turn, the economic boost that the plant would 
provide.112  According to the court, such evidence was sufficient to 
confirm that the city would execute its eminent domain power to 
address a public need.113  Even if the takings would benefit private 
interests, subjecting the public purpose inquiry to greater scrutiny, any 
private benefit would merely be incidental.114 
Perhaps the Michigan Supreme Court was correct in overturning 
the Poletown decision when it ruled in Wayne that the fact that a private 
entity might contribute to the health of the economy does not justify an 
exercise of eminent domain to transfer property to that private entity.115  
Specifically, in a story that closely mirrors that of New London, the result 
in Poletown has been one of broken promises.116  Originally, while some 
such as Detroit’s then-mayor Coleman A. Young Jr., auto unions, and 
even the Catholic Archdiocese supported GM’s plans, much of 
Poletown—which was largely composed of working-class, multi-ethnic 
residents117—vehemently opposed it.118  The opposition, ironically led 
by the Archdiocese’s reverend, seemed to fight relentlessly, working day 
and night to save their cherished neighborhood.119  The result, however, 
was a lost war—one culminating in failed holdouts (which required a 
 
 110 Id. at 459. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459. 
 113 See id. at 459–60. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (2004).  Rather, consistent with 
Justice Ryan’s dissent in Poletown, the court stated that it is justified as for public use in 
only the following contexts: (1) collective action is required due to extreme public 
necessity (such as for highways and roads); (2) the property remains subject to public 
oversight; or (3) the property is selected based on public concern and not based on 
interests of the private entity.  Id. at 781–83. 
 116 See, e.g., Kyle Swenson, Thousands Lost Their Homes in Epic Fight to Build GM’s 
Detroit Plant. Now It’s Closing., WASH. POST: MORNING MIX (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/27/thousands-lost-their-homes-
epic-fight-build-gms-detroit-plant-now-its-closing. 
 117 See, e.g., Tommy Andres & Tracey Samuelson, How the Closings of Two Auto Plants 
Changed Hamtramck and Detroit’s Poletown, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.marketplace.org/2019/08/14/how-the-closings-of-two-auto-plants-
changed-hamtramck-and-detroits-poletown. 
 118 Swenson, supra note 116. 
 119 Id. 
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SWAT raid) and, ultimately, the destruction of the churches, homes, and 
local businesses they knew so well to “a skeletal wreck.”120   
Indeed, the result was a destruction for GM—for private 
investment in the name of economic development—as well.121  
Eventually, the plant was built.122  Surely to the community’s dismay, GM 
employed only half the number of people it had originally promised to 
employ.123  Then, in 2018, GM announced plans to cease production at 
the plant124 and lay off the plant’s remaining staff.125  Like Pfizer, GM got 
up and left, leaving a trail of ruins behind.126  One resident, Tom 
Olechowski, who was named on the lawsuit filed to stop the plant’s 
construction, attested to the “unique viability” that Poletown had, 
particularly due to its church-based community, contending that 
“rundown” is a subjective concept.127  His statement that what used to 
be a “thriving [market]” is now a “wreck . . . . ruin . . . . fields”128 suggests 
that the GM plant had never been a public necessity. 
More recently, Amazon selected Newark, which is, in fact, a 
qualified opportunity zone,129 as a potential location for the company’s 
new headquarters.130  In an attempt to secure a deal with the company, 
former Governor Chris Christie offered the company massive tax 
incentives totaling about $7 billion.131  Furthermore, the city would 
redevelop its waterfront area for the headquarters site; redevelop 11.5 
acres in the downtown area; and even demolish what used to be the New 
Jersey Bears stadium.132  Without concluding that such developments 
would be completed particularly to serve and support Amazon, as when 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 E.g., id. 
 123 Amy Crawford, Can Poletown Come Back After a General Motors Shutdown?, 
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/
poletown-history-general-motors-hamtramck-shutdown/577678. 
 124 Swenson, supra note 116. 
 125 Michele Oberholtzer, Opinion, GM’s Poletown Closure Proves We Should Treat 
Corporations Like People, DETROIT METRO TIMES (May 1, 2019), https://www.metro
times.com/detroit/opinion-gms-poletown-closure-proves-we-must-regulate-public-
subsidies-for-business-developments-that-wont-last-foreve/Content?oid=21552899. 
 126 Andres & Samuelson, supra note 117. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 E.g., Opportunity Zones, CHOOSE NEW JERSEY, https://www.choosenj.com/business-
assistance/opportunity-zones (last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
 130 E.g., Leanna Garfield, Amazon Just Visited New Jersey—and the State Is Offering a 
$7 Billion Incentive to Land HQ2, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.business
insider.com/amazon-headquarters-hq2-new-jersey-economic-incentive-2017-10. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
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the City of New London attempted to support Pfizer, one may 
nevertheless find in the Amazon saga echoes of the cases discussed 
above.  Indeed, Amazon projected that, with its new headquarters, the 
company would contribute an estimated 50,000 jobs on what would be 
a $5 billion campus.133  Former Governor Christie even stated that the 
result would be “jet fuel” for Newark’s revival.134   
And, indeed, the plan was similarly met with criticism and 
concern.135  Some said that the “win-at-all-costs” tax incentive would 
only worsen Newark’s poor credit rating, which, as it stood, made 
Newark one of the worst business climates in the nation.136  Another 
said that the incentive would yield a net loss for New Jersey taxpayers.137  
Even Seattle, home to Amazon’s first headquarters, cautioned that while 
the first headquarters had led to Seattle’s economic boom, the city 
simultaneously saw dramatic increases both in home values and in its 
homeless population.138  The community, too, expressed concern, 
particularly regarding gentrification and whether the headquarters 
would actually create wealth for those who need it most.139  In fact, 
although Newark has seen improvement, with new residential towers 
and even a Whole Foods springing up downtown, poverty is pervasive 
and persistent in the vicinity.140  As Amazon did not end up choosing 
Newark as its headquarters location,141 it is uncertain whether the 
corporation would have actually benefited Newark residents—
particularly considering that it would be bringing white-collar jobs 
 
 133 Id. 
 134 Jonathan O’Connell, Will Amazon Pick Underdog Newark for Its HQ2? Experts 




 135 See, e.g., id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 O’Connell, supra note 134. 
 141 Joan Verdon, Newark Loses Bid to Land Amazon’s New Headquarters, NORTH JERSEY 
RECORD (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.northjersey.com/story/money/2018/11/13/
amazon-hq-2-newark-loses-bid-amazon-long-island-city-crystal-springs-va/15069
22002.  Amazon instead chose Arlington County, Virginia as the location for its new 
headquarters.  Patricia Sullivan, Amazon Gets Final Approval for Its New HQ in Arlington 
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suited for those who have a college education to an area home to a large 
working-class population.142 
The Opportunity Zone program differs from the above stories in 
two major respects.  First, investment in opportunity zones does not 
necessarily stem from large companies like Pfizer, GM, and Amazon 
because even individuals may choose to invest by placing their capital 
gains in qualified opportunity funds.143  Second, the Opportunity Zone 
program is not reliant on the use of eminent domain, unlike the cases of 
Kelo and Poletown.  Despite these differences, the stories above highlight 
the attitudes and concerns that communities may have when private 
investment is used as a means for economic development, as is the case 
in the Opportunity Zone program; and particularly that those attitudes, 
while they may differ from those of investors and of the governing 
officials who seemingly side with such investors, are not groundless.   
Kelo and Poletown especially evidence that, consistent with 
residents’ concern, an investment that is purportedly made to improve 
the lives of those in its vicinity may well end up instead hurting those 
lives and benefiting others.  The efficacy of private investment, when 
done in the name of economic development, may well depend on 
investors’ ability to listen to the communities in which they invest, pay 
 
 142 See O’Connell, supra note 134.  Such tension among residents, private individuals, 
and governing officials again resurfaced in Newark in August 2019, when the city hosted 
MTV’s Video Music Awards amidst a drinking water crisis (a lead contamination) 
affecting residents’ water supply for over two years.  Josiah Bates, Several Arrested 
Outside MTV VMAs in Newark After Protests Over Lead in City’s Water, TIME (Aug. 26, 
2019), https://time.com/5662239/newark-vmas-lead-water-protests.  Dozens of 
protesters, several of whom were arrested, protested outside of the Prudential Center, 
where the awards ceremony was taking place, as celebrities made their way on the red 
carpet.  Id.  The protesters’ chants that “[w]e don’t want no MTV, we want our water lead 
free,” id., highlights precisely the aforementioned tension.  While the event was expected 
to serve as a boost to Newark’s economy, especially for its restaurant and hospitality 
industries, MTV Video Music Awards Bring Entertainers, Fans and Protesters to Newark, 
CBS N.Y. (Aug. 26, 2019), https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2019/08/26/mtv-vmas-at-
prudential-center-in-newark, and to create 1,000 jobs, Chris Jordan, MTV VMAs in NJ 
2019 at the Prudential Center in Newark: It’s a Jersey Thing, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Aug. 21, 
2019), https://www.app.com/story/entertainment/music/2019/08/21/mtv-video-
music-awards-2019-prudential-center-newark-its-jersey-thing/2062592001, it is 
reasonable to conclude that not all residents, and particularly not those protesting, were 
on board.  Thus, the priorities of governing officials are not necessarily in line with those 
of residents; and, as the aftermaths of Kelo and Poletown have revealed, there is wisdom 
in listening to our communities, in addressing what residents believe to be their needs, 
rather than following at seemingly all cost, as many governing officials have, the promise 
of private investment as a means for economic development. 
 143 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z–2 (2019), which consistently refers to “the 
taxpayer.”  § 7701(a)(14) defines “taxpayer” as “any person subject to any internal 
revenue tax,” id., and, in turn, § 7701(a)(1) defines “person” as including “an individual, 
a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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heed to their particular needs and wants, and match their investments 
to those needs and wants.  As a final and arguably more similar story, 
which also points to the desirability of listening to communities, 
consider that of enterprise zones. 
B.  Enterprise Zones 
The concept of enterprise zones originated in England and made its 
way to the United States Congress in a bi-partisan bill—the Urban Jobs 
and Enterprise Zones Bill—in 1980.144  During the 1980s, as Congress 
did not actually pass federal legislation, many states adopted the idea by 
developing, instead, state enterprise zone programs.145  Like the 
Opportunity Zone program, enterprise zone programs seek to 
encourage business activity and job growth in economically distressed 
areas through the use of tax incentives.146 
The concept of enterprise zones arose from the “spatial mismatch” 
theory147 which, initially proposed by economist John Kain in 1968, 
argues that African Americans’ lack of access to employment is caused 
by the tendency for jobs to be located in areas distant from their 
residences.148  But evidence reveals that the enterprise zone concept 
fails to address such lack of access.149  Furthermore, according to several 
studies completed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, it fails 
to generate jobs and produce the economic growth that it purports to 
generate.150  Academic studies conclude similarly, indicating, for 
example, that enterprise zones do not affect the employment of 
residents of enterprise zones.151   
Many different reasons can explain the failure of enterprise zones.  
One is that businesses have found ways of benefiting from tax incentives 
without actually helping those within the enterprise zones.152  For 
example, a business may merely relocate to an enterprise zone from an 
 
 144 Marilyn Marks Rubin & Edward J. Trawinski, New Jersey’s Urban Enterprise Zones: 
A Program That Works, 23 URB. L. 461, 462–63 (1991). 
 145 Id. at 463. 
 146 See id. at 462. 
 147 Jan Rosenberg & Philip Kasinitz, Why Enterprise Zones Will Not Work: Lessons from 
a Brooklyn Neighborhood, CITY J. (Autumn 1993), https://www.city-journal.org/html/
why-enterprise-zones-will-not-work-12612.html. 
 148 Samuel Cohn & Mark Fossett, What Spatial Mismatch? The Proximity of Blacks to 
Employment in Boston and Houston, 75 SOC. FORCES 557, 557 (1996). 
 149 See Rosenberg & Kasinitz, supra note 147. 
 150 Bruce Bartlett, Enterprise Zones: A Bipartisan Failure, FISCAL TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/01/10/Enterprise-Zones-Bipartisan-
Failure. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
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area just outside it, bringing itself but not bringing new jobs along with 
it.153  In fact, one study of New Jersey enterprise zones confirms this by 
revealing increased economic activity in enterprise zones but at the 
expense of surrounding areas.154  A second explanation is that tax cuts 
are not sufficient to incentivize businesses to invest in inner cities, as 
their decision not to invest in such cities is not due to high taxes.155  A 
third explanation, particularly relevant to the federal Urban Jobs and 
Enterprise Zone Act, is the failure to address the unique needs of the 
individual communities, serving instead as a “one-size-fits-all,” complex 
solution that, ultimately, benefits the wealthy rather than the people 
within the communities.156  Notably, it is upon reflecting on this failure 
of the Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act that one commentator urged, 
“it’s important to keep in mind there are real people in each opportunity 
zone and the benefits of any investment should primarily seek to meet 
their needs.”157 
C.  Applying the Theory of Asymmetric Information 
In The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,158 George Akerlof introduced the concept of asymmetric 
information to explain why, in many markets, bad quality drives out 
good quality—in other words, the problem of adverse selection.159  To 
demonstrate his theory, he introduced a four-part framework for the 
automobile market; in any such market, there are both new cars and 
used cars, and within those two categories, there are subcategories of 
good quality and bad quality cars.160  Thus, the market consists of good 
quality new cars, bad quality new cars, good quality used cars, and bad 
quality used cars.161  When purchasing a new car, a buyer is not certain 
 
 153 Id. 
 154 Timothy Weaver, Tax Law’s ‘Opportunity Zones’ Won’t Create Opportunities for the 
People Who Need It Most, THE CONVERSATION (May 15, 2018) (citing Marilyn Rubin, Urban 




 155 Bartlett, supra note 150. 
 156 Buzz Brockway, Georgia’s Struggling Areas Could Benefit from Smart Use of Federal 
Opportunity Zones, SAPORTAREPORT (Feb. 17, 2019), https://saportareport.com/
georgias-struggling-areas-could-benefit-from-smart-use-of-federal-opportunity-zones. 
 157 Id. 
 158 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECONOMICS 488 (1970). 
 159 See id. 
 160 Id. at 489. 
 161 Id. 
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about the quality of the car; it can be a good one or a bad one (a 
“lemon”).162  The buyer instead assigns probabilities to the two possible 
scenarios.163  For example, there may be a thirty percent chance that the 
car is of good quality and a seventy percent chance that it is of bad 
quality.164 
Suppose, then, that the buyer purchases the car, uses it, and 
subsequently decides to sell it to a second buyer.165  Now that the first 
buyer has used the car, the buyer has more information about its true 
quality.166  Still, the second buyer purchasing the now-used car does not 
have such information.167  The transaction is one of asymmetric 
information, where the parties to the transaction possess different 
levels of information.168  The second buyer, too, must assign 
probabilities to the two possible scenarios.169  Because the second buyer 
cannot know the true quality of the car, and because the second buyer, 
as an outsider, cannot tell the difference between good and bad quality 
(lemon) cars, both good quality cars and lemons will sell at the same 
price, K.170  Assuming that K is based on the probabilities that the buyer 
assigns to the two possibilities, K must be lower than the value of a good 
car.171  Why, then, would the owner of a good quality car sell in a market 
where the price the owner will receive will be less than the value of the 
car?172  Asymmetric information leads to a problem of adverse 
selection.173  What is worse, noted Akerlof, is if the actual market is not 
categorized as simply bad vs. good.174  Thus, it may be that the bad drives 
out the not-so-bad; the not-so-bad drives out the medium; the medium 
 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Akerlof, supra note 158, at 489. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See id. 
 167 See id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See Akerlof, supra note 158, at 489. 
 171 See id.  For example, assume that a good car’s true value is $200, a bad car’s true 
value is $100, and the buyer assigns probabilities of thirty percent and seventy percent, 
respectively, to the two scenarios.  The maximum price, K, that the buyer would be 
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 173 See id. at 489, 492–93. 
 174 See id. at 490. 
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drives out the not-so-good; and the not-so-good drives out the good, 
such that there is no market left whatsoever.175 
Akerlof supported his theory by presenting evidence of the adverse 
selection problem, existing as a result of asymmetric information, in the 
markets for insurance; for the employment of minorities; and for credit 
in underdeveloped countries.176  He then presented various 
“institutions,” or societal customs, that counteract the negative impact 
of asymmetric information, “of quality uncertainty.”177  One institution, 
brand names, serves both as an indicator of quality and an assurance for 
consumers to be able to retaliate, by not making future purchases, if the 
quality is below expectation.178  Other institutions include hotel and 
restaurant chains as well as the licensing practices of professions, such 
as for lawyers.179 
Michael Spence, then, took the theory further by exploring the 
concept of “market signaling,” particularly within the job market, where 
employers are not certain, even after hiring employees, about their 
employees’ productive capabilities.180  Here, a prospective employee 
may “signal” his quality to a potential employer through various 
indicators, such as education,181 and the employee will indeed invest in 
education if its benefit, vis-à-vis the wage that the employer is willing to 
pay the employee, exceeds the cost of attaining that education.182 
Finally, Joseph Stiglitz explored the idea of screening, or identifying 
the qualities of individuals or commodities.183  For example, if the cost 
of screening is sufficiently low, an employer will benefit from screening 
potential employees, thus being able to identify which of them are of 
higher productivity and which are of lower productivity, and hiring the 
high-productivity type.184  If, suddenly, all employers know of the 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 Akerlof, supra note 158, at 492–99. 
 177 Id. at 499–500. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 500. 
 180 See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECONOMICS 355, 355–56 (1973). 
 181 Id. at 357. 
 182 See id. at 358.  Moreover, for the signal to be effective as a distinguishing factor 
between good and bad quality, the cost of the signal must be negatively correlated with 
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even those with lower capabilities will get an education as the benefit will outweigh the 
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 183 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of “Screening,” Education, and the Distribution of 
Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 283 (1975). 
 184 Id. at 286. 
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information revealed by the screening, employers will engage in a sort 
of competitive bidding to attract the high-productivity employees, thus 
driving up their wages to reflect the true quality of their work.185  Note 
that this will hurt the low-productivity employees, who will 
simultaneously see a drop in their wages to reflect the true, lower 
quality of their work.186  Nevertheless, argues Stiglitz, even the low-
productivity employees could be better off, particularly due to the social 
benefits of screening; one such social benefit is better “matching.”187  
Stiglitz gives the example of a typist and plumber, explaining that an 
economy is better off if those who are good at typing become typists, 
while those who are good at plumbing become plumbers.188  If workers 
are matched to occupations based on their unique capabilities, and thus, 
based on what they are more efficient in completing, all tasks will be 
completed more efficiently; the broader economy will end up with more 
typing and more plumbing.189 
Unfortunately, Kelo, Poletown, enterprise zones, and opportunity 
zones all feature information asymmetries, particularly between 
residents of the target communities on the one hand and investors 
(whether individuals, funds, or companies, and the governing officials 
that support them) on the other.  Consider, for example, a company (one 
might say Amazon) looking to establish a new headquarters.  The 
company searches for a target location, unaware of whether that 
location is a “good” one, meaning well-suited for such a headquarters, 
or a “bad” one, meaning ill-suited for such a headquarters.  
Communities, on the other hand, know (more so than does the company, 
an outsider) whether they are well-suited or ill-suited—good or bad.  
They know whether they have the resources, the labor force, and, 
generally, the business environment that would sustain a corporate 
headquarters.  They know their wants and needs.  The company is 
willing to pay more—and, perhaps, to receive less of a tax incentive—for 
a good location; conversely, it is willing to pay less for a bad location.  
Unsure of whether the location is a good or bad one, the company settles 
for a price in between.  Communities, however, knowing their own 
value, will not accept a price lower than that value.  Why sell a good car 
for a price more akin to that of a lemon?  The result, then, is that ill-
suited locations are the ones that try to “sell” themselves to the 
company, that try to attract investment.  In such a world, where no 
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information regarding the quality or suitability of a location is 
exchanged between communities and investors—between sellers and 
buyers—the market may, as Akerlof postulated, be driven out 
completely. 
Fortunately for both investors and communities, this market also 
has institutions in place such as those described by Akerlof, particularly 
that of brand names.  As the saying among realtors goes, “location, 
location, location!”  For some companies, that location may be the 
“brand” of Silicon Valley.  For others, it may be that of Fifth Avenue in 
Manhattan.  Moreover, as suggested by Spence, communities may 
engage in “market signaling.”  For example, a company or investors may 
have a better idea of whether a location would be well-suited based on 
demographic or socioeconomic data of the location’s residents.  Lastly, 
consistent with the ideas put forth by Stiglitz, “screening” for such 
suitability would ultimately benefit a variety of locations.  Those that are 
well-suited would attract fair prices, consistent with their respective 
values, and, what is more, the broader economy would benefit from 
better matching. 
What the issues of asymmetric information and adverse selection, 
as mollified by the concepts of “signaling” and “screening,” may teach us 
is that, underlying the stories considered above—beneath the failed 
attempts at private investment in the name of economic 
development—is the lack of communication between investors and the 
communities they have sought to invest in, particularly regarding 
suitability.  And greater information regarding suitability, about what 
communities actually want and need, whether provided by the 
communities (via signaling) or affirmatively searched for by investors 
(via screening), leads to greater matching and thus greater productivity 
and development.  Perhaps, then, it was a lack of communication and, 
ultimately, of matching, that caused so much criticism from the 
communities in Kelo and Poletown—that drove the failure of Pfizer’s, 
GM’s, and enterprise zone investors’ attempts for economic 
development.  Indeed, it does not take economic theory to understand 
this issue; one need only hear the echoes of mismatch in the voices of 
those who expressed concern about Amazon’s potential move, of those 
who protested outside the VMAs during Newark’s water crisis.190 
For an active, well-functioning market for investment, where 
locations are properly targeted based on suitability, and thus, one in 
which private investment does actually lead to economic development 
(from which residents benefit), there must be communication, signaling, 
 
 190 Supra note 142. 
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and screening between investors and communities.  As demonstrated 
by the failed attempts for economic development in Kelo and Poletown 
and in enterprise zones, as understood by the opposition to Amazon’s 
potential presence in Newark and those protesting outside of the VMAs, 
as suggested by commentators, and as confirmed by economists alike, 
there may be a great benefit to ensuring that investments are matched 
to the particular communities in which they manifest.  The benefit is not 
just to the communities.  Rather, through better “matching,” the benefit 
should accrue to investors, communities, and the national economy at 
large.  We must listen to the communities in which we invest. 
IV.  NOT AS SIMPLE AS LISTENING—CONSIDERING RISK 
While listening to our communities can further the purpose of the 
Opportunity Zone program, the road to success is not that easy.  
Inevitably, any prudent investor will take into account many other 
considerations, including the various risks that the investor faces, when 
deciding where and in which projects to place their capital proceeds.  
After all, the choice is an investment decision, from which investors 
arguably expect to see a pecuniary return, rather than a mere donation.  
And the risks can be many. 
A.  Possible Sources of Risk 
Risks may arise from other investors.  For example, there may be 
high demand for a particular opportunity zone location.  Thus, the first 
investor to reach the location may not be facing very high prices to 
acquire property.  Prices may, however, increase, even if only 
incrementally, by the time that the second investor reaches the location.  
Of course, this is a simplified image of reality.  Still, the idea is that as 
more investors flock to a location, the forces of supply and demand will 
push up prices, making it more expensive for an investor to acquire 
property.191  Furthermore, there is a risk of market bubbles; sellers of 
property in opportunity zones, anticipating increased demand for their 
property, may inflate prices to values greater than those reflecting 
reality.192 
 
 191 See Lydia O’Neal, Opportunity Zones Boost Real Estate Prices as Investors Rush In, 
BLOOMBERG TAX (June 27, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/
opportunity-zones-boost-real-estate-prices-as-investors-rush-in. 
 192 See Miriam Hall, Property Values, Investment Appetite Surge In New York’s Many 
Opportunity Zones, BISNOW N.Y. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/new-
york/news/capital-markets/2019-forecast-event-95431. 
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Risks may also arise from local governments.193  Especially for an 
investor who is new to the location in which he seeks to invest, there can 
be political uncertainties and hurdles that need to be dealt with.194  
Whether in obtaining permits and zoning allowances or in something 
more basic such as the ability to get involved and feel welcome in the 
community, there may be political favoritism, resistance, games, and the 
like at play.195  Moreover, risks may arise from communities themselves.  
As the stories above teach us, it may be difficult to appease every 
individual in a community, resulting in backlash to the investor and, 
ultimately, to the investor’s project and return on investment.  Even if 
communities are welcoming of the investor and the project initially, 
there may be a risk that the excitement fades, or that, despite the 
excitement, the project just does not click. 
There may be risks inherent in the geographic location as well.  
These may be environmental (for example, higher risk of earthquakes) 
or man-made, such as when an area is historically industrial or located 
near an airport, thus lacking clean air.  Some locations, moreover, may 
simply be less favorable than others, considering proximity to amenities 
such as schools, highways, public transportation, and beaches.  Note, 
however, that the latter factors may suggest a lack of suitability—an 
impossibility of listening—for some projects in the first instance. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there may be risks inherent 
in the type of business itself; every type may have a different risk 
profile.196  And while suitability to a location (vis-à-vis consistency with 
community wants and needs) may increase the chance that a given type 
of business will be successful—in other words, generate sufficient 
return—in the location, as noted above, suitability may not be the magic 
key to success.  It may not be enough to completely get rid of the risk 
 
 193 See, e.g., Adam Michel & Joel Griffith, The Big Fib About “Opportunity Zones” and 
Your Tax Dollars, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 12, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/
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inherent in the type of business.  Furthermore, it may be the case that 
several different types of businesses are suitable to a location, yet one is 
still riskier than the other simply because the business belongs to an 
industry that has a high turnover rate; is prone to cyclical pressures;197 
requires greater upfront investment;198 is new, leaving a lot of room for 
mistakes and learning; faces fluctuating levels of demand; is dependent 
on foreign suppliers in a country with a lot of political risk; is trendy but 
not sustainable;199 or is more likely to be subject to tort liability.  It may 
even be that the business only has a short lifecycle in the location, that 
the location could outgrow the business.200 
B.  Evidence of Lower-Risk Opportunity Zone Investment 
Investors’ risk aversion is evident from the categories of 
businesses and places to which investment funds initially began to flow.  
In Louisville, Kentucky, for example, several areas were designated as 
opportunity zones even though those places were already being 
developed—even though major capital investments were already made 
in those areas in recent years.201  At the same time, seven of the eighteen 
poorest tracts in Louisville were not designated as opportunity zones.202  
While this may reflect the governor’s understanding, or intent, that the 
effect of development in those areas will spill over into the poorer tracts, 
such intent or effect is not certainly clear. 
What is worse, and what undermines the probability of such intent, 
is the existence of further, similar instances.  One study, which assesses 
states’ selections of their opportunity zones, indicated that less than a 
third of opportunity zones are located in tracts with low levels of 
investment.203  Of the eligible tracts, those that had already experienced 
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sizable socioeconomic change more frequently ended up being 
designated.204  In New York, for example, thirteen percent of 
opportunity zones had already seen high levels of socioeconomic 
change.205  As a further example, the website that Erie, Pennsylvania has 
put in place to attract opportunity zone investors itself points to the 
significant amount ($750 million) of investment that anchor 
institutions, including Fortune 500 companies, have made “[o]ver the 
last few years.”206  By marketing itself to more investors by pointing to 
past investments,207 Erie purports to be an attractive place for 
investment, regardless of the Opportunity Zone program.  It invites 
opportunity zone investors to join the team and support not necessarily 
new, but instead, pre-existing development efforts.208  In Oakland, 
California, too, one developer sought to take advantage of the 
Opportunity Zone program by raising an $85 million fund to support its 
efforts to build a mixed-use complex, but the project existed well before 
the Opportunity Zone program was even enacted; the developer bought 
the land for the project in 2016.209 
Indeed, Howard Gleckman, a senior fellow at Tax Policy Center, 
noted that, due to the structure of the program, the best investments for 
developers consist of places that are already gentrifying.210  Gleckman 
gave the example of a Hilton Hotel, stating that it “just doesn’t make 
sense” to build one in a “dying rural city,” regardless of the tax 
incentive.211  This is not to say that there will never be overlap between 
opportunity zone investment and investment prior; however, it is the 
prevalence of overlap which makes one wary—which suggests that 
money is flocking to areas that were already being developed and thus 
less risky.  A place that is already being developed arguably poses fewer 
hurdles and less risk to opportunity zone investors.  It may not require 
so much legwork, such as research, navigating the political landscape, 
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such activities.  As the owner of the Oakland, California project’s 
development company stated about the Bay Area, an opportunity zone 
“could miss out on some Opportunity Zone investments because of its 
notoriously long entitlement process.”212  Especially for inexperienced 
investors, he states, this can be a “heavy lift.”213  Another California 
investor, who seems to be starting from scratch, has decided to build 
residential property in an area where he knows that developers have been 
buying property.214 
It may be argued that it is irrelevant that opportunity zone 
investments are taking place in areas that were already being 
developed; that, if anything, the added funds only enhance and 
strengthen existing projects.  But why, then, did the government choose 
to forego tax revenue by way of the opportunity zone incentives?  Why 
incentivize investors if no such incentive is necessary?  And how, then, 
will funds reach those communities that continue to be ignored?  How 
will funds reach those communities despite the hurdles and risks of 
starting anew? 
The categories of initial investments, too, reveal investors’ risk 
aversion.  A May 2019 article pointed out that most opportunity zone 
investments had been in real estate, particularly because such 
investments are safer.215  For the tax incentives to operate, the 
legislation requires that fifty percent of the income generated is done so 
within the opportunity zone; and it is simply more reassuring that a real 
estate investment will meet this standard.216  Even after the IRS 
provided clarification as to how the standard can be met, and while 
some investors expressed interest in other projects such as technology 
startups, the focus continued to largely be on real estate.217  Many 
investors and tax professionals who have been involved in opportunity 
zone deals estimated that eighty to ninety percent of such deals were so 
focused.218  What is more, they concerned urban, as opposed to rural, 
areas,219 which may be a further indicator of investors’ risk aversion.  As 
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one commentator who similarly pointed to the trend toward real estate 
stated, “[t]he math is easier”; one simply has to buy property, make 
improvements, and then sell it for a higher price.220  In fact, according to 
the CEO of one investment firm, strong real estate performance in recent 
years is particularly what drove interest in opportunity zone funds.221  
Many overlooked the fact that funds can be devoted to other industries 
and businesses, such as manufacturing, daycare centers, and grocery 
stores, as well.222  Thus, the tendency of funds to invest in real estate has 
been noticeable.  In addition, this tendency has been seemingly driven 
by investors’ risk aversion—whether arising from uncertainties in the 
legislation or in the traditional risk and return profile of such 
investments, as compared to other types that are allowed under the 
legislation. 
V.  MORE RISK, MORE INCENTIVE 
The possibilities and sources of risk are seemingly endless, and 
early instances of opportunity zone investment reveal that investors are 
indeed conscious of such risk.  And where there is greater risk, investors 
want greater return.223  This is the basic idea of “required rate of return,” 
or the minimum return that an investor will accept for holding an 
investment based on the level of risk associated with holding that 
investment.224  The greater the risk, the greater the minimum return or 
compensation required.225 
The current opportunity zone legislation ignores such differences 
and instead provides a one-size-fits-all, widely applicable tax incentive; 
it does not discriminate based on location, type of investment, or other 
factors, such as whether an investor is the first to “arrive” or choose to 
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invest in an opportunity zone.226  In fact, this has been a point of 
criticism, as not all opportunity zones are created equally.227  
Specifically, some opportunity zones, such as South Norwalk in 
Connecticut, may be more enticing than others.228  South Norwalk 
already has a booming real estate market, driven by young 
professionals’ attraction to the neighborhood’s nightlife and restaurant 
scene; however, neighborhoods just a short trip away, in Bridgeport, do 
not measure up as investment opportunities, regardless of the tax 
incentive.229  By the same token, rural areas may not be as attractive as 
urban areas;230 zones with no prior investment may not be as attractive 
as those with development already in the works; and regardless of 
suitability, some types of investments, like educational centers, may not 
capture investors to the same extent as others, such as residential 
buildings. 
Thus, it is not enough that an investment will help the community.  
It is not enough that the community and governing officials are excited 
about the legislation.  While Congress’s primary goal may be to 
accelerate economic development, investors may not share in 
Congress’s vision, instead seeking primarily to attain a profit.  First and 
foremost, the investment must make sense, and then, the tax incentive 
can serve as a bonus, albeit maybe a significant one.231  As the chief 
executive of one opportunity zone fund stated, “The deals should be the 
same deals you’d be doing if they weren’t in an opportunity zone.”232  
Investors will consider the potential for return on their investment, and 
such potential necessarily implicates considerations of risk.  But if the 
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https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Tax-questions-answered-
Opportunity-Zone-fund-13992079.php?psid=maqd0.  Similarly, a managing director in 
the national tax office of a leading accounting firm stated, “If the project does not stand 
on its own and the fundamentals aren’t there, it’s not a good deal.”  Sullivan, supra note 
227 (quoting Marla Miller, managing director with BDO). 
 232 Sullivan, supra note 227. 
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Opportunity Zone program is to be successful in promoting and 
enhancing the economic well-being of the zone communities; if the road 
to success consists of matching investors to specific zones and specific 
projects—reflecting communities’ wants and needs—within those 
zones; and if not all zones and projects are created equally, investors 
must be enticed—pulled in—where enticement is lacking. 
Thus, the current, federal legislation should be augmented by 
additional tax incentives that compensate investors for the 
comparatively additional risk they would have to take on in placing their 
capital gains in zones and projects that impose it.  Investors can be 
compensated based on the type of project (for example, housing; 
commercial real estate; education center; technology start-up; grocery 
store); type of locale (urban or rural); proximity to amenities that are 
suitable to the type of project needed (for example, public 
transportation, if the type of project that a community needs would be 
best served by proximity to public transportation); or even based on the 
sequential order in which investors choose the locale.233  But as past 
instances of private investment in the name of economic development 
suggest, it is not enough to simply attract funds; rather, funds must be 
appropriated to projects within communities based on communities’ 
specific wants and needs.  Thus, such incentives should be based on the 
first category—type of project. 
Ideally, the additional incentives should be provided by local (state 
or municipal) governments rather than the federal government.  In fact, 
this is seemingly necessary for the additional incentive program (let us 
call the additional incentive program ‘OZ2’ and the current Opportunity 
Zone program ‘OZ1’) to function successfully, as every state, and every 
locale, is unique—geographically, socioeconomically, in its 
history—and thus, each warrants its own consideration.  Such 
uniqueness has two implications: first, each community may differ in its 
wants and needs; and second, each community may pose different levels 
of risk for different types of projects.  Moreover, as discussed above, risk 
can encompass many different factors.  For example, if an investor seeks 
to build a hotel, risk can stem from the difficulty of getting land-use 
permits in the locale in which the investor seeks to build.  It may also 
stem from the inherent risk of the hotel industry.  And it may be that the 
 
 233 This, however, may beckon an analysis of whether it is riskier, or less risky, to be 
among the first to invest in a locale.  One might think that the first investor faces more 
risk than the last, but it may well be that the last investor, facing increased costs to 
acquire zone property, needs to be incentivized even more.  In fact, it is possible that, as 
the number of investors in a zone increases, the attractiveness of the zone increases at 
a decreasing rate, hits a peak, and then decreases at an increasing rate—like a big roller 
coaster drop. 
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inherent risk of the hotel industry is itself affected by legal hurdles, such 
as the need to get land-use permits and engage with the relevant locale 
or municipality. 
For example, assume that risk can be measured on a one-to-ten 
scale (of relativity), with one constituting the lowest possible level of 
risk and ten constituting the highest possible level of risk.  Consider, 
then, an opportunity zone fund that seeks to build a high-end restaurant.  
Imagine the fund is choosing between Zone A, which is an up-and-
coming neighborhood home to a lot of young professionals who work in 
high-paying industries; Zone B, which is an economically down-trodden 
city with high rates of homelessness and crime, but home to many 
commercial towers (say—for a thriving legal industry); and Zone C, 
which is a small town located about thirty miles away from a major city 
but only five miles away from several corporate headquarters.  All three 
zones have expressed interest in bringing in an opportunity zone fund 
to build a high-end restaurant.  Zone A wants it for entertainment; Zone 
B wants it for hospitality jobs; and Zone C wants it as an alternative to 
the local pizzeria.  If you, the reader, represented the fund, which would 
you choose as the least risky?  Zone A is home to a crowd of young 
professionals and thus potential eager-to-spend customers.  A high-end 
restaurant in Zone A has a risk level of four.  Zone B might get a big lunch 
crowd, but who would want to spend a night on the town in an area 
known for high rates of homelessness and crime?  What would be a risk 
level of two for Zone B is now a risk level of seven.  Zone C, too, might 
get a big lunch crowd, and while it will not be as busy as Zone A at night, 
it certainly will not be as empty as Zone B.  Instead, it may nonetheless 
see some evening customers, such as local families and couples.  What 
would be a risk level of three for Zone C is now a risk level of five.  This 
largely simplified version of reality demonstrates the unique package 
that each zone represents to investors, to opportunity zone funds.  What 
may be a low-risk project in one zone may be a high-risk project in 
another, and it may well be that the same project matches the wants 
and/or needs of both communities. 
Thus, if OZ2 offers additional incentives for additional risk, and if 
such risk can stem from so many factors, all of which vary by locality, 
local governments are arguably best suited to provide the right 
incentives for the right needs and wants of their communities.  The more 
local the government, the stronger should be the ability of the 
government to understand the community; to adopt a micro view so as 
to identify and measure the various sources and levels of risk within 
their locales; to identify the projects that the community wants or needs; 
to assess what level of risk a given project would possess in the 
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pertinent community; and thus to provide appropriately measured 
incentives.  OZ1 is a one-size-fits-all federal legislation, blind to the 
unique wants and needs of communities and blind to the unique risks 
imposed by those communities.  OZ2 would be the formal, custom-
tailored solution that would augment and ensure the success of 
OZ1—the success for which many communities now hope.234 
In fact, early on, some states and cities began to augment federal 
incentives so as to attract investors,235 but not necessarily to attract 
them to specific types of needed projects.  In West Virginia, lawmakers 
created an income tax exemption for opportunity zone investment.236  
Florida attempted to align opportunity zones with enterprise zones, 
allowing investors to benefit from both programs.237  The incentives, or 
proposals for incentives, moreover, have not been merely pecuniary.  In 
Connecticut, for example, lawmakers considered exempting historic 
preservation requirements.238  On the other hand, Maryland considered 
providing historic preservation tax credits for opportunity zone 
businesses and even providing tax credits for opportunity zone 
businesses hiring formerly imprisoned individuals.239  But rather than 
merely providing such additional incentives (including those that may 
be available to non-opportunity zone investors as well), local 
governments should provide incentives compensating for risk to attract 
funds specifically to those projects that their constituent communities 
need, that match their communities’ wants.  As our country’s experience 
teaches us, this is the key to ensuring the success of OZ1—of ensuring 
economic development to those for whom it was intended. 
 
 
 234 See supra Part II. 
 235 See J. Brian Charles, States, Cities Add Sweeteners to Attract ‘Opportunity Zone’ 
Investors, GOVERNING (Apr. 17, 2019, 3:23 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/
finance/gov-opportunity-zones-extra-incentives.html.  See also JOB OPPORTUNITIES TASK 
FORCE, HIRING EX-OFFENDERS IS GOOD BUSINESS: A GUIDE TO TAX CREDITS AND FEDERAL BONDING 
BENEFITS FOR MARYLAND BUSINESSES, http://www.pastforwardmd.org/pdf/jotf_guide_
to_business_incentive.pdf; Maryland Bill to Establish OZ Incentives, Extend State HTC 
Awaits Governor’s Signature, NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.novoco.com/news/maryland-bill-establish-oz-incentives-extend-state-
htc-awaits-governors-signature. 
 236 Joshua L. Jarrell & James Conlan Lynch, West Virginia Opportunity Zone Incentives 
Available, NAT’L L. REV. (July 24, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/west-
virginia-opportunity-zone-incentives-available. 
 237 Charles, supra note 235. 
 238 Comm. on Planning and Dev. 6552, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019), 
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/connecticut_6552_032719.
pdf. 
 239 Charles, supra note 235. 
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The incentives may take on various forms.  They may be in the form 
of deductions, credits, deferment, reduced rates, or multi-year tax 
holidays.240  Governments may find it especially attractive to offer types 
of incentives, such as deferment, that do not exactly match risk increases 
with rate reductions, as this may weaken the need to measure risk 
specifically.  An alternative to specific measures of risk, however, would 
be to rank project types (perhaps on a scale similar to, but more 
sophisticated than, the one above) based on the risk they pose.  For 
example, a government that seeks to provide lower (capital gains) tax 
rates for higher-risk projects may set a minimum agreed upon rate 
based on its budget and fiscal capacity; apply that rate to the highest-
risk project (in other words, the project that is ranked as such on the 
risk scale); and then increase that rate incrementally based on the rank 
that a project holds on the risk scale—the lower the rank, the higher the 
tax rate.  Furthermore, a rank-based system is versatile; it could apply 
to deductions, credits, deferments, and tax holidays as well. 
Nevertheless, the best measure, as the most accurate one, would be 
one that matches the amount of compensation to the amount of 
risk—for example, by reducing the tax rate for a given type of project in 
direct proportion to the return foregone by investors for taking on 
additional risk—but this would most definitely require significant 
quantitative analysis and modeling and thus, presumably, financial 
resources.  The analysis may include looking at the historical 
performance of similar projects within a given community and 
comparing it to risk-free or lower-risk assets, or even asking whether 
there are any new risks or risks that no longer exist so as to affect 
reliance on past returns.  If no such projects exist within a community, 
one may look at returns on similar projects beyond that community and 
assess how risk factors existing within, or absent from, that community 
may lower, or increase, such returns.  One may argue that an alternative 
to such complex quantification is for the government to just subsidize 
projects or, perhaps, even act as an investor alongside private investors 
for a project, achieving similar results without having to quantify risk.  
Indeed, a government may even choose to offer a conditional subsidy, 
where the subsidy would be provided only if the project yielded a return 
on investment lower than a given threshold.  The issues with these 
methods are that first, a government may not have the financial 
resources to subsidize a project directly, and second, the alternative of 
acting as an investor alongside private investors may well raise conflicts 
of interest and criticism from both residents and investors. 
 
 240 See, e.g., David Holland & Richard J. Vann, Income Tax Incentives for Investment, in 
2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 986 (Victor Thuronyi, ed., 1998). 
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Governments should be aware of their resources and abilities 
when deciding how to implement OZ2.  Moreover, they should consider 
that taking a more complicated route, such as measuring risk 
specifically, may be more costly at first but, in the long run, yield a lower 
cost.  This would be the case if, in sacrificing specificity, a government 
were to implement a rank-based program or turn to a non-pecuniary 
alternative, such as deferment, that would end up overcompensating 
investors.  Also, the less complicated routes, if they yield inaccurate 
results, would raise issues of fairness and equity.  Governments should 
also be careful not to distort economic incentives to the extent that 
investors end up over-investing in opportunity zones to the exclusion of 
communities that do not qualify as opportunity zones but nonetheless 
need additional or continued investment.  This, however, seems unlikely 
unless a particular government has a budget sufficient to support such 
incentives. 
Further difficulties may arise in defining types of projects or 
businesses clearly enough so as to avoid investor confusion.  For 
example, is a “wine and paint” business considered an arts center, an 
entertainment center, a bar, or something else?241  Such difficulties may 
be avoided by creating a profile of available projects, assigning 
incentives to each project (rather than type of project), and letting funds 
choose from the profile, but this would encroach on investors’ 
autonomy. 
Note that compensating for risk will not normalize the playing field 
so as to make every project equally attractive.  This is because, first, it is 
likely difficult to measure risk accurately and correspondingly 
compensate for it.  Second, there are other things not necessarily 
stemming from communities, such as value added by business 
managers, that affect a business’s success.  Governments should also 
take care to structure such incentives in a manner that does not facially 
or otherwise discriminate against interstate commerce, which would 
open the door to Dormant Commerce Clause challenges.242  Lastly, 
governments must consider how far they are willing to go to incentivize 
investors, and at which point incentives and compensation begin to 
erode the purpose of the program in reallocating (or sacrificing) 
taxpayer funds to private entities. 
 
 241 One webpage calls it “a niche of the entertainment franchise category.”  Paint and 
Wine Franchise Industry, PINOT’S PALETTE, https://franchise.pinotspalette.com/paint-
and-sip-business-opportunity (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
 242 See, e.g., Commerce Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
commerce_clause (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Stories of private investment in the name of economic 
development, especially as viewed in light of economic theory, highlight 
the importance of matching community needs and wants to the success 
of programs that undertake it.  But in any attempt to attract investors to 
specific needs and wants, governments and communities must bear in 
mind that listening is not all there is to it—that investors have 
considered and will continue to consider, as with near any other 
investment, what may be a broad concept of risk.  And where there is 
more risk, investors will ask for more return.  Thus, for the Opportunity 
Zone program to be successful, state and local governments should 
assess not just their needs and wants but also their unique imposition 
of risk.  Upon doing so, they should augment the current legislation with 
their own incentives—with those that compensate for risk—so that 
benefits of the Opportunity Zone program also accrue to the 
communities and to the residents for whom they were intended. 
